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Abstract 
Many governments encourage migrants to participate in volunteer 
activities as a stepping stone to labour market integration. In the 
present study, we investigate whether this prosocial engagement 
lowers the hiring discrimination against them. To this end, we use 
unique data from a field experiment in which fictitious job 
applications are sent in response to real vacancies in Belgium. Ethnic 
origin and volunteer activities are randomly assigned to these 
applications. While non-volunteering native candidates receive more 
than twice as many job interview invitations as non-volunteering 
migrants, no unequal treatment is found between natives and 
migrants when they reveal volunteer activities. 
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1 Introduction 
The labour market integration of migrants1 has received much attention both in policy 
and academic circles during the past decade. A frequently reported finding in related 
academic work is that immigrants’ socio-cultural integration is key to their labour 
market success (see, e.g., Bisin et al., 2011; Constant and Zimmermann, 2008). 
Therefore, not surprisingly, countries such as Austria, Belgium,2 Canada, Denmark, Italy, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have encouraged the migrants they host to 
participate in volunteer activities in “mainstream” organisations (European Commission, 
2012; Handy and Greenspan, 2009; OECD, 2008).3 This participation in volunteer work 
outside their own communities not only helps migrants to catch up with natives in terms 
of human and social capital (European Commission, 2012) but also signals better 
integration to employers (Handy and Greenspan, 2009).4 As a consequence, it may lower 
hiring and wage discrimination. On the one hand, following Becker’s (1957) model of 
taste-based discrimination, employers as well as their employees and customers may 
have less distaste for interacting with well-integrated migrants compared with their less 
integrated counterparts (Adida et al., 2014; Handy and Greenspan, 2009). On the other 
hand, following Arrow’s (1973) model of statistical discrimination, the volunteering 
signal may weaken stereotypes with respect to foreign job candidates’ productivity, 
values and motivation (Baert and De Pauw, 2014; Derous et al., 2009). 
This study, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to assess the empirical link 
                                                     
1 Throughout this manuscript, when referring to (im)migrants, we refer to (im)migrants in a broad sense, i.e. individuals 
with an (im)migration background. These can be first generation migrants (if the migration occurred during their own 
life), second generation migrants (if their parents migrated to Belgium before their birth) or even third generation 
migrants. 
2 In some cities in Belgium, the country where we gathered our data, for instance, language courses for migrants are 
made conditional on a number of hours spent volunteering (source: http://www.inburgeringantwerpen.be/participeren). 
3 European Commission (2012) mentions that “volunteering […] is an essential component of what the European 
Commission called the Common Basic Principles of Integration.” 
4 As mentioned by European Commission (2012), immigrant volunteering serves both as an instrument for and as an 
indicator of socio-cultural integration. 
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between the volunteering undertaken by ethnic minorities and the labour market 
discrimination that they face. If volunteering acts as a discrimination-reducing device, 
this is relevant to individual migrants (when considering prosocial activities) as well as to 
volunteer-based organisations (when planning communication strategies to attract 
(immigrant) volunteers) and policy makers (when considering additional stimuli for 
immigrant volunteering). In addition, we investigate whether the empirical link between 
immigrant volunteering and discrimination is heterogeneous by gender and education 
level.  
To this end, we analyse field experimental data gathered by correspondence testing, 
as introduced and refined by, amongst others, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), 
Eriksson and Rooth (2014) and Sharma et al. (2015). In the next section, we describe our 
research method, in which we sent fictitious job applications in response to real 
vacancies in Belgium and randomly assigned volunteering and ethnicity to these 
applications. In Section 3, we analyse the tested employers’ reactions by the 
intersection of ethnicity and volunteering. Section 4 concludes the study. 
2 Data 
We gathered our experimental data between December 2014 and April 2015 in 
Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. We sent one pair of fictitious job 
applications to genuine vacancies in this region. For each vacancy, we randomly 
assigned volunteering activities to one of the pair members. The migrant status of the 
applicants was equal at the pair level, but was randomly assigned between pairs. 
Thereafter, reactions from the employer side were analysed to investigate the 
interaction of both treatments (volunteering and migrant status) on the probability of 
positive call-back. In what follows, we describe our experiment in more depth. 
We created two templates (“Type A” and “Type B”) of curricula vitae and cover 
letters for two education levels. Middle-educated pairs held a secondary education 
degree in commerce, while high-educated pairs held a bachelor’s degree in office 
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management. These degrees allowed us to apply for almost all commercial and 
administrative positions at the upper-secondary education and first-stage tertiary 
education levels. Type A and Type B applications differed in inessential details and in 
layout but were identical in all job-relevant characteristics, conditional on education 
level. All the applicants were born and living in Antwerp, the largest city of Flanders. 
Examples of the templates used are available in the Online Appendix. 
We sent two applications, one of Type A and one of Type B, to each of 576 randomly 
selected vacancies from the database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders: 288 
vacancies targeted at our middle-educated pairs and 288 vacancies targeted at our high-
educated pairs. One member of each candidate pair mentioned volunteer activities in 
the “Other activities” section of her/his curriculum vitae. To eliminate any application-
type effects on call-backs, we alternately assigned the volunteering and non-
volunteering identity to the Type A and Type B applications. The volunteering candidate 
mentioned volunteer activities at a life-saving food provider and/or at a cancer 
foundation and/or (as an equipment manager) at a sports club. 
We alternated between pairs with (non-stereotypical) Flemish-sounding names and 
pairs with (non-stereotypical) Turkish5-sounding names. However, to avoid unequal 
treatment due to administrative reasons, all the pairs had the Belgian nationality. In 
addition, we alternated the gender of the pairs. The resulting combinations were sent to 
the employers in an alternating order, each time with approximately 24 hours in 
between the pair members. 
As a consequence of our experimental design, while the treatment of volunteering 
was randomly assigned within pairs of applicants, the treatment of a foreign-sounding 
name was randomly assigned between pairs of applicants. An alternative design would 
have been to send quartets of applicants to each vacancy with a random assignment of 
all ethnicity–volunteering combinations. This would have yielded more statistical power 
at the cost of a (substantially) higher risk of detection of the experiment.  
                                                     
5 The Turkish community forms the most important ethnic minority in Antwerp with a substantial representation at the 
tertiary education level. 
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The data for the pairs with a Flemish-sounding name were analysed by Baert and 
Vujić (2016) with a focus on the general premium of volunteering. We refer to their 
study for further details on the experimental data gathering. 
3 Results 
The reactions from employers were received by telephone voicemail or email. Table 1 
synthesises these call-backs by ethnic origin and volunteer activities. Overall, candidates 
with a Flemish-sounding name received a positive reaction (i.e. a job interview 
invitation, a question to provide more information or a proposal of an alternative 
position) in 19.3% of their applications. They were immediately invited to a job interview 
in 9.7% of the cases. The corresponding percentages for their Turkish counterparts were 
15.3% and 6.4%, respectively. The positive call-back ratio is then calculated by dividing 
the positive call-back rates of the immigrant subsample by the corresponding positive 
call-back rates of the native sample. This yields positive call-back ratios of 0.793 and 
0.661: immigrant candidates received about 20.7% fewer positive reactions in a broad 
sense and 33.9% fewer job interview invitations. These call-back ratios are significantly 
different from 1 at the 10% and 5% significance level, respectively, and are in line with 
the evidence for ethnic discrimination in Belgium in 2012 presented by Baert et al. 
(2015). 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
When we break down the data according to whether the candidates revealed 
volunteer activities, we find that the discrimination ratio varies with mentioned 
volunteering in the expected direction. Non-volunteering migrants received 37.8% fewer 
positive call-backs in a broad sense (rate for natives: 0.156; for immigrants: 0.097) and 
54.2% fewer job interview invitations (rate for natives: 0.083; for immigrants: 0.038) 
than non-volunteering natives. In sharp contrast, the positive call-back ratios are close 
to (and not statistically significantly different from) 1 when comparing volunteering 
immigrants with volunteering natives. Therefore, we cannot reject equal treatment of 
 
6 
natives and immigrants when they both volunteer. 
Next, we combine the variation in the two studied outcomes (any positive reaction 
and a job interview invitation) by means of an ordered logit regression model. The 
probability of the volunteering applicant receiving a positive call-back was correlated 
with the probability of the non-volunteering applicant sent to the same vacancy 
receiving one. Therefore, we present standard errors corrected for clustering at the 
vacancy level.  
Table 2 presents the model estimates as odds ratios. The dependent variable of this 
model is 2 in the case that the candidate was immediately invited to a job interview, 1 in 
the case that (s)he received any other positive reaction and 0 in the case that (s)he had 
no (positive) reaction at all. In model (1), we regress this variable on (i) an indicator of a 
candidate with a Turkish name, (ii) an indicator of volunteer activities mentioned in the 
candidate’s curriculum vitae, (iii) an interaction between the former two variables (the 
main variable of interest) and (iv) an indicator of using job application template type B. 
In line with Table 1, we find that the odds of a better outcome (a job interview invitation 
versus any other positive reaction; any other positive reaction versus no positive 
reaction) is 29.4% lower for candidates with a Turkish name. In addition, and in line with 
Baert and Vujić (2016), the overall volunteering premium is substantial. More 
importantly, however, we find that ethnic discrimination is significantly heterogeneous 
by revealed prosocial engagement of job candidates. The aforementioned odds ratio 
comparing the positive call-back rates for native and immigrant candidates is 53.2% 
higher in cases in which volunteer activities are mentioned. Finally, the coefficient for 
the variable indicating type B applications shows that the small differences between the 
application templates did not yield significantly different call-back outcomes for the type 
A and type B versions. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
Many countries stimulate immigrant volunteering among the low-educated and 
among females in particular. Because they are less successful in terms of labour market 
integration than their high-educated and male counterparts, the marginal benefits (in 
terms of human and social capital and employers’ willingness to hire them) are expected 
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to be higher for them (European Commission, 2012; OECD, 2008). Regression model (2) 
in Table 2 measures whether the relationship between immigrant volunteering and 
discrimination is indeed heterogeneous by the gender and education level of the job 
candidates. Therefore, variables indicating high-educated and male candidates are 
included as such and in interaction with the three independent variables of model (1). 
However, no statistically significant results are found with respect to the triple 
interactions between immigrant status, volunteering status and education level or 
gender.6 
4 Conclusion 
In this study, we reported on a field experiment designed to test the relationship 
between immigrant volunteering and immigrant discrimination. Our results indicated 
that volunteer activities undertaken by immigrants lower the hiring discrimination that 
they face and, as a consequence, foster their labour market integration. Hence, our 
findings are, to some extent, in favour of governments promoting volunteering among 
immigrants. On the other hand, if volunteering activities by immigrants are promoted on 
a large scale and are, thereby, scaled up, one could expect that its signalling value might 
decrease. 
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Table 1. The Probability of Receiving a Positive Call-Back by Ethnic Origin and 
Volunteering: Descriptive Analysis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Data selection 
Positive call-back 
rate native 
subsample 
Positive call-back 
rate immigrant 
subsample 
Positive call-
back ratio: 
(2)/(1) 
t-value 
A. Positive call-back: any positive reaction 
All candidates [N = 1152] 0.193 0.153 0.793* 1.794 
Candidates not revealing volunteer 
activities [N = 576] 
0.156 0.097 0.622** 2.134 
Candidates revealing volunteer 
activities [N = 576] 
0.229 0.208 0.909 0.604 
B. Positive call-back: job interview invitation  
All candidates [N = 1152] 0.097 0.064 0.661** 2.057 
Candidates not revealing volunteer 
activities [N = 576] 
0.083 0.038 0.458** 2.274 
Candidates revealing volunteer 
activities [N = 576] 
0.111 0.090 0.813 0.830 
The t-test assesses the null hypothesis that the probability of a positive call-back is the same for candidates from both 
subsamples. *** (**; *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%; 10%) significance level. 
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Table 2. The Odds of Receiving a Positive Call-Back by Ethnic Origin and 
Volunteering: Ordered Logit Estimates. 
 
(1) (2) 
(a) Immigrant 0.706* (0.139) 0.772* (0.179) 
(b) Immigrant x Volunteering (normalised) 1.532* (0.360) 1.635* (0.420) 
(c) Immigrant x Volunteering x High-educated (normalised)  0.863 (0.456) 
(d) Immigrant x Volunteering x Male gender (normalised)  1.403 (0.676) 
(e) Immigrant x High-educated (normalised)  0.706 (0.322) 
(f) Immigrant x Male gender (normalised)  1.647 (0.680) 
(g) Volunteering (normalised) 1.587*** (0.245) 1.552** (0.271) 
(h) Volunteering x High-educated (normalised)  0.964 (0.352) 
(i) Volunteering x Male gender (normalised)  0.501** (0.162) 
(j) Job application template type B (normalised) 1.074 (0.121) 1.070 (0.128) 
(k) High-educated (normalised)  4.290*** (1.329) 
(l) Male gender (normalised)  0.411*** (0.116) 
Observations 1152 1152 
Variables (b), (e), (f), (g), (j), (k) and (l) are normalised by subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of immigrants. 
Variables (c), (d), (h) and (i) are normalised by subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of volunteering 
immigrants. The presented statistics are odds ratios. The dependent variable is 2 (1; 0) in the case that the candidate was 
immediately invited to a job interview (any other positive reaction; no positive reaction). Standard errors, corrected for 
clustering at the vacancy level, are between parentheses. *** (**; *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%; 10%) 
significance level. 
 
